BOOK REVIEWS
The Supreme Court in the American System of Government. By Robert H.
Jackson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955. Pp. viii, 92. $2.00.
Evaluation of the work and personality of the late Mr. Justice Jackson has
only begun. Yet it is not too soon to assert that be has earned a secure place in
the history of the Supreme Court as one of its most interesting and colorful
personages. No doubt, a part of his fascination stems from the contrasts and
contrarieties of his character. That he was a man of solid and outstanding
talents, few would care to deny. But it is also true that his brilliance was accompanied by more than the usual measure of eccentricity. Those fortunate
enough to have known him will testify to his charm and the warmth of his
friendship. Yet, on attack, his sarcasm would bite and his scorn could sting.
It ought not to be inferred, however, that Mr. Justice Jackson is of interest
only or primarily because of the enigmatic and paradoxical quirks of his personality. One of his uncontestable claims for historical attention lies in the
quality of his written expression. At its best, his prose has rarely been matched
in sheer force and persuasiveness. Probably more than one law-school instructor
presiding over a discussion of, say, the dissenting opinion in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,' has looked on in dismay while Jackson's language worked something
close to paralysis on the critical faculties of his class. But perhaps the basic
explanation of his fascination and influence lies in his fierce insistence that the
path he trod should be his own and in his formidable candor. He was not made
for the role of disciple and obviously scorned discipleship in others. This independence of spirit led him to no strange goals. His values were, on the whole,
traditional and conservative. But if his ultimate objectives were shared by
others, living and dead, the pattern of his thought was distinctly of his own
construction.
It would be pleasant to report that this little book, published posthumously,
may be taken as Justice Jackson's valedictory in which significant light is shed
on the man and his thought or on the great theme he selected for discussion.
Unfortunately, neither assertion can fairly be made-which, of course, is not
to say that these pages are devoid of interest and importance. The book consists
of three undelivered lectures which were intended to be given at Harvard in the
winter following the Justice's death. More work remained to be done. We are
told by his law clerk and his son, who capably prepared the manuscript for publication, that several more drafts were contemplated. Nevertheless, the main
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outline and much of the detail of the argument as it would finally have been
presented are prbbably here.
Despite the polishing which was yet to be done, the lectures had already acquired a considerable verbal sheen. Compelling sentences and paragraphs can
be discovered throughout the work. Thus, the author writes: "INlot one of
the basic power conflicts which precipitated the Roosevelt struggle against the
judiciary has been eliminated or settled, and the old conflict between the
branches of the Government remains, ready to break out again whenever the
provocation becomes sufficient. ' 2 Again: "In Great Britain, to observe civil
liberties is good politics and to transgress the rights of the individual or the
minority is bad politics. In the United States, I cannot say that this is so."'
And typically: "When the court moved to Washington in 1800, it was provided
'4
with no books, which probably accounts for the high quality of early opinions."
The first lecture sounds the note of alarm and disquiet which was heard so
frequently in justice Jackson's judicial opinions. "The fact is that we face a
rival, secularized system of faith and order spread with a religious fervor not
witnessed since the tides of Islamic fanaticism receded." 5 Already we have departed from our historical idealism: "It is true that we have suffered some
intellectual demoralization, which has proceeded far-to the point where speculative freedom is regarded as the equivalent of revolutionary action.", Nor does
the author offer easy optimism as to our capacity to meet successfully the modem challenge. The second lecture, entitled "The Supreme Court as a Law
Court," is notable chiefly for the Justice's statement of unqualified opposition to the continuance of diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts.
It is, however, in the third lecture that the main burden of the argument i&
found. The Justice takes upon himself the task of determining the extent
to which the Supreme Court may be relied upon "to maintain the form of
government we have established and prefer." 7 A series of typical and critical
issues are surveyed: executive against legislature, federalism, civil liberty, and
others. In each area the Court, because it is a "political instituti6n," has a role
to play. But, according to Justice Jackson, in none of these can the Court's
action be really decisive. Hence, ultimate reliance upon it is misplaced. Thus,
discussing the problems of individual freedom, he says: "[I]t is my belief that
the attitude of a society and of its organized political forces, rather than its
legal machinery, is the controlling force in the character of free institutions.",,
The point is a sober one and in recent years has been frequently made,
though not often so effectively as in these lectures. Certainly it is true that a
free society can not preserve those political values which it "has established and
prefers" by delegating the responsibility for their nourishment and protection to a judicial tribunal or any other institution. There is no keeper of the
people's conscience in such a society but the people themselves. It is no
doubt true that the source of many of our difficulties has been our willingness
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to attempt delegation of nondelegable duties. But surely this is not the end of
the matter. What role, if any, does the Court have to play in the creation of
such responsible citizenship, given the institutional development which has
actually occurred during a century and a half? It is not difficult to suggest
areas where vigorous defense of individual rights by the Court seems to have
encouraged intelligent political response, rather than the contrary. The cases
involving judicial supervision of state criminal procedures under the Fourteenth
Amendment, of which Justice Jackson was generally critical, may provide one
example. The doctrines which have so spectacularly developed in the field may
be criticized for the tensions created and for their numerous irrationalities. And
yet it is demonstrable that in many particular situations, the Court has opened
the way to sensible local legislative action by identifying and dramatizing problems which tend to become submerged and obscured in the welter of public
issues confronting any modern legislature. Conceding that the Court has a
limited role to play in the preservation of our political values, may it not be
true, however, that, in the situation which actually confronts us, it is an indispensable role? These are intriguing questions. One might wish that Mr.
Justice Jackson had given them more explicit consideration.
FRANcrs A. ALLEN*
*

Professor of Law in Harvard University.

The Communist Theory of Law. By Hans Kelsen. New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., 1955. Pp. viii, 203. $5.00.
Few Western legal theories have been more strongly criticized by Soviet
jurists than that of the so-called pure theory of law. It is, therefore, quite fitting
that Hans Kelsen, the founder and leading advocate of that theory, should now
see fit to write this acute analysis of Communist theories of law. Dr. Kelsen, at
the outset, frankly confesses his own ignorance of the Russian language; his
work is based upon German, French, and English translations of the works of
leading Soviet writers. It cannot be denied that this dependence upon translated material makes the basis for the Kelsen study far from adequate from a
theoretical point. of view. At the same time, in this reviewer's opinion, it is far
more preferable to have this study upon Kelsen's terms than not to have it at
all. Certainly, it is more fruitful to have Kelsen devote his juristic genius to
translations of Soviet writers than to have a second-rate jurist, who happens to
possess the necessary linguistic knowledge, do a similar job upon the Russian
originals.
Dr. Kelsen starts his analysis by a critique of the doctrinal base of Soviet
legal theory-namely, the Marx-Engels theory of State and law. As almost
everyone knows, the dominant feature in the Marx-Engels theory is the doctrine
of the "withering away" of the State and law. What is not so well known, however, is what this doctrine really means in practice. According to a celebrated

